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NOTES
PLAINTIFFS' DIRECT EVIDENCE
BURDEN IN MIXED-MOTIVE
DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES:
AN ANALYSIS IN LIGHT OF COSTA V.
DESERT PALACE
INTRODUCTION
Catharina Costa was the only woman operating forklifts and
pallet jacks in a warehouse at Caesar's Desert Palace, a casino in
Las Vegas.' While Costa's work was described as "good" and
"excellent," she was also the target of disciplinary action and sex-
ist remarks to which her male counterparts were not subjected.2
For example, when male workers missed work for medical rea-
sons, they were given overtime opportunities to make up the time.
When Costa missed work for similar reasons, she was disciplined.
A supervisor followed Costa around the warehouse to such an ex-
tent that her coworkers characterized the activity as "stalking.
' 3
When Costa allegedly used equipment in a hazardous manner or
used foul language, she was warned or suspended, while her male
coworkers engaged in similar activity without penalty.4
Costa was terminated after a coworker physically assaulted
her in an elevator. Costa immediately reported the incident to un-
ion officials and her story was corroborated with photographs of
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), affid, Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
2 Costa, 299 F.3d at 844-46.
-1 Id. at 845.
4 Id. Costa was also called "the lady Teamster," "bitch," and was told she had "more
balls than the guys," though trial testimony indicated that she got along with most of her co-
workers, many of whom also engaged in swearing and physical altercations. Id. at 845-46.
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her bruises and an eyewitness account of the incident. Purportedly
because of conflicting stories told by Costa and her coworker, and
despite the corroborating evidence, Caesar's terminated Costa but
only suspended her coworker. 5 After an arbitrator upheld her dis-
charge, Costa filed a disparate treatment claim in district court.6
Caesar's maintained that Costa's history of disciplinary problems,
culminating in the elevator incident, was the sole reason for the
decision to discharge her. Costa did not claim that Caesar's prof-
fered reason for her discharge was pretext, 7 but instead argued that
her gender was also a motivating factor in the decision. Thus, the
district court, and eventually the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court, was
presented with a classic "mixed-motive" disparate treatment case. 8
Originally, Title VII disparate treatment cases were analyzed
under the assumption that there was only one reason for an adverse
employment decision. 9 That reason could either be legitimate,
such as poor performance, or illegitimate, such as unlawful dis-
crimination based on the employee's race or gender, but it could
not involve both legitimate and illegitimate factors.' ° Based on
this assumption, and recognizing that evidence of unlawful dis-
crimination is difficult for plaintiffs to obtain, the United States
Supreme Court provided a framework for proving disparate treat-
ment in employment decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green." This framework has proved to be a useful tool for courts
trying disparate treatment cases involving pretext in the nearly
three decades since its inception.'
2
Id. at 846.
6 Id. Costa also filed a sexual harassment claim, which was dismissed by the district
court on summary judgment. Id.
7 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (stating that the
plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to prove the employer's proffered reason for an ad-
verse employment action is pretext for discrimination); see also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (clarifying the plaintiffs opportunity to prove pretext);
discussion infra Part H.
8 See HENRY J. PERRITr, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991: SPECIAL REPORT 138 (1992)
("When one of the reasons for an adverse employment decision is race, sex, religion, or national
origin, a court hearing a Title VII claim must deal with the mixed-motive problem."); see also
Costa, 299 F.3d at 848 (noting that cases are "sometimes labeled with the 'mixed-motive'
moniker" where a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment
action).
9 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). The
language and meaning of Title VII are discussed infra Part III.
'0 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989) ("[Tihe premise of [the
pretext framework] is that either a legitimate or an illegitimate set of considerations led to the
challenged decision.").
11 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
12 See, e.g., Joseph J. Ward, Note, A Call for Price Waterhouse II: The Legacy of Justice
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In creating this framework, however, the Supreme Court
failed to acknowledge that discriminatory animus is not always the
only factor motivating an employment decision.' 3  The Court at-
tempted to fashion a remedy for this oversight sixteen years later,
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.14 Unfortunately, the Court's plu-
rality opinion and two concurrences 5 created more problems than
they solved.' 6  Particularly controversial was Justice O'Connor's
statement that in order to utilize mixed-motive analysis in Title VII
disparate treatment cases, 7 plaintiffs were required to present "di-
rect evidence" that discrimination was a "substantial factor" in the
adverse employment action.' 8 Courts and commentators alike have
been unable to agree on the definition of "direct evidence."' 9 Add-
ing to the confusion was Congress' failure to specifically address
the direct evidence requirement when it passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.20 Even until recently, 2' over ten years after that legis-
lation and the Price Waterhouse decision, the circuit courts were in
22disarray over the requirement.
O'Connor's Direct Evidence Requirement for Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination
Claims, 61 ALB. L. REV. 627, 660 (1997) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework has
enabled plaintiffs to bring successful claims of intentional discrimination for decades).
1 See PERRrtT, supra note 8, at 185 (explaining that employment decisions are often
made by institutions, as opposed to individuals, such that many different motives are factors in
those decisions, and describing the appropriate method for assessing the role of discriminatory
motives).
14 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (addressing mixed motives under Title VII for the first time). The
Court had addressed the issue of mixed motives in the employment context after deciding
McDonnell Douglas and prior to 1989, but not under Title VII. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt.
Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (analyzing the National Labor Relations Act); Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (analyzing the First Amendment). These cases
are discussed infra Part I.
15 See 490 U.S. at 231 (plurality opinion); id. at 258 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
11 See, e.g., Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992) (express-
ing frustration with the Supreme Court's "splintered" Price Waterhouse opinion).
17 Mixed-motive analysis is discussed more fully infra Part II.
18 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19 Compare Femandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 583-84 (1st Cir.
1999), and Ward, supra note 12, at 662-64 (supporting a strict definition of direct evidence),
with Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1300-02 (11 th Cir. 1999), and Kelley E. Dowd,
Casenote, The Correct Application of the Evidentiary Standard in Title VII Mixed-Motive
Cases: Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1095, 1125-26
(1995) (concluding that direct evidence may include circumstantial evidence in mixed-motive
cases).
2) Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075. The Act was passed in
response to several 1989 Supreme Court decisions, including Price Waterhouse.
21 In June 2003, the Supreme Court decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, specifically do-
ing away with any requirement for direct evidence in mixed-motive Title VII cases. 123 S. Ct.
2148 (2003).
22 See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[Justice
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It should be noted at this point that the vast majority of this
Note was written prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in the
Costa case.23 In that opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides the clearest answer to the
mixed-motive problem: its language is clear and unambiguous and
"does not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff make a
heightened showing through direct evidence. 24  Furthermore,
since Congress has specifically required direct evidence in other
circumstances, its failure to do so in the 1991 Act demonstrated its
25intention not to require a higher evidentiary showing.
While the Desert Palace decision was in line with the conclu-
sion of this Note, the Court focused solely on the statutory lan-
guage of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, something
that few lower courts had focused on in light of the Price Water-
house decision. In doing so, the Court ignored its own precedent,
the congressional history of both statutes, and the confusion over
the meaning of direct evidence that was generated by Price Water-
house. Thus, this Note addresses those issues that the Court did
not, while also examining the statutory language of both Title VII
and the 1991 Act. 26 Part I explores the history of mixed-motive
analysis outside the Title VII context, examining First Amend-
ment, equal protection, and labor cases. Part II discusses the gene-
sis of both pretext and mixed-motive analyses in Title VII cases,
focusing primarily on McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse.
Part III examines Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and their
legislative intent. Part IV discusses the different approaches taken
by the circuit courts in applying Justice O'Connor's direct evi-
dence standard. Part V explores whether or not direct evidence is
really necessary in mixed-motive cases in order to achieve Title
VII's goals. Finally, the Note concludes that the Supreme Court's
decision in Desert Palace - affirming the Ninth Circuit's opinion
that direct evidence is not necessary in mixed-motive cases - was
O'Connor's reference to direct evidence] has spawned a virtual cottage industry of litigation
over the effect and meaning of the phrase.").
23 See Desert Place, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
24 Id. at 2153.
25 Id. at 2154 (noting that Congress has been "unequivocal" when it has required height-
ened proof in other situations).
26 This Note does not dispute the Court's conclusion that the statutory text begins and
ends the analysis in this particular case. See id. at 2153. The Note suggests, however, that there
were additional factors the Court could have relied on in reaching its conclusion in order to
definitively clear up the confusion among the lower courts over the meaning of direct evidence
and the implications of its application.
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the correct one, though the Court could have based its decision on
a variety of factors, not just the language of the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
I. MIXED-MOTIVE ANALYSIS OUTSIDE TITLE VII
Prior to confronting the mixed-motive issue in Title VII em-
ployment discrimination cases, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue in a variety of other contexts. Its decisions in these cases
proved to be instructive when the Court decided Price Waterhouse.
A. Mixed Motives in the Context of Equal Protection
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing De-
velopment Corp.,27 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
mixed motives in the context of an equal protection claim. The
Village of Arlington Heights, a virtually all-white suburb of Chi-
cago, was zoned primarily for single-family homes. In the early
1970s, a religious order that owned a large parcel of vacant land,
surrounded by single-family homes, contracted with a nonprofit
developer to build low- and moderate-income housing on the par-
cel. The developer, Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
("MHDC"), was experienced in federal housing subsidies and had
developed similar sites throughout Chicago. MHDC and the reli-
gious order entered into a 99-year lease and sale agreement that
was contingent on MHDC's obtaining zoning clearances from the
Village. MHDC contracted with an architect and went ahead with
its plans to build the housing with the expectation that smaller
units would attract elderly citizens, larger units would be available,
and a large portion of the parcel would remain undeveloped with
shrubs and trees.28
In order to build such units, MHDC needed the Village to re-
zone the parcel for multiple-family housing. MHDC followed the
procedure for a rezoning request and the Village Planning Com-
mission held three public hearings on the matter, each of which
drew large crowds of residents, some in favor of the project but
most in opposition. Some of the comments during these meetings
targeted the desirability (or lack thereof) of having low- and mod-
erate-income housing, which would probably be racially inte-
grated, in the Village. However, most of the comments focused on
the zoning aspects of the project, arguing that the surrounding area
was zoned single-family and that citizens in those neighborhoods
27 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
28 Id. at 255-57.
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had relied on that fact when purchasing their homes. In addition,
rezoning the parcel would violate the Village's zoning requirement
that multiple-family zoning only serve as a buffer between single-
family zoning and commercial zoning because there was no com-
mercial zoning near the planned project.29
The Planning Commission recommended that the Village
Board of Trustees deny the rezoning request, but did not specifi-
cally state its reasons for doing so. The Board of Trustees adopted
the Commission's recommendation and denied MHDC's rezoning
request. MHDC and some minority individuals filed a lawsuit,
claiming the Village had violated their equal protection rights.
The Supreme Court first noted that legislative and administra-
tive bodies are generally accorded deference in their decision-
making, unless the decisions are arbitrary or irrational. The Court
noted that this deference would also not be justified where it was
30shown that discrimination was a motivating factor in a decision.
In determining whether discrimination was a motivating factor, "a
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of
intent as may be available" is required. 3' The Court provided ex-
amples of the types of evidence that could be used in making the
determination.32 The Court concluded that MHDC had failed to
carry its burden of proving that discrimination was a motivating
factor in the denial of the rezoning request. 33 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Supreme Court noted that had MHDC carried its bur-
den, the burden of persuasion would have shifted to the Village to
prove that it would have made the same decision regardless of any
considerations of the racial makeup of the proposed development.
If the Village were able to carry this burden, MHDC would not be
able to claim that discrimination was an improper factor in the
decision, and relief would be denied.34
With this decision, the Supreme Court first articulated the
"same decision" affirmative defense available to defendants in
mixed-motive cases. 35 In doing so, the Court recognized that ex-
29 Id. at 257-58.
30 Id. at 265-66.
31 Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 267 (explaining that the historical background of the decision, the specific se-
quence of events leading to the decision, and departures from normal procedures may all be
potentially probative of discriminatory motivation).
-- Id. at 270-7 1.
.4 Id. at 270 n.21.
-5 See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 857 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the
"same decision" defense allows employers to escape the imposition of some forms of relief,
such as reinstatement and back pay).
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amination of both direct and circumstantial evidence would be
necessary for the plaintiff to satisfy his burden of persuasion and
shift the burden to the defendant. The Court did not impose a
higher evidentiary burden on the plaintiff before allowing the bur-
den of persuasion to be shifted.
B. Mixed Motives and the First Amendment
The Court first recognized that both legitimate and illegiti-
mate factors might affect employment decisions in Mt. Healthy
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,36 decided the
same day as Arlington Heights.37 In Mt. Healthy, plaintiff Doyle
worked as an untenured teacher from 1966 to 1971. During that
time, he was also elected president of the Teachers' Association
for a one-year term and served on the Association's executive
committee.
Starting in 1970, Doyle was involved in a series of incidents
related to his teaching position. In one incident, Doyle was in-
volved in an argument with another teacher that resulted in that
teacher slapping Doyle. Doyle refused to accept an apology, and
both he and the other teacher were suspended. In other incidents,
Doyle argued with a cafeteria employee over the amount of food
given to him, referred to students as "sons of bitches," and made
an obscene gesture toward two female students after they failed to
obey him when he was supervising the cafeteria. 38 The straw that
broke the camel's back, so to speak, was Doyle's call to a local
radio station, revealing the contents of a memorandum circulated
to teachers by the school principal. Doyle was displeased with the
memorandum, which concerned instituting a teacher dress code,
because he thought the matter was to be settled through negotia-
tions with the Teachers' Association.
After the contents of the memorandum were broadcast as
news by the radio station, Doyle apologized to the principal and
conceded that he should have vented his frustration and concerns
to the school board directly. Nonetheless, a month later the school
superintendent recommended that Doyle not be rehired for the fol-
lowing year. The board adopted the recommendation and told
Doyle that the decision was based on his "notable lack of tact in
handling professional matters," the incidents he had with students,
36 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
37 See supra Part I.A.
38 429 U.S. at 281-82.
2003]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
and his call to the radio station. 39  Doyle then sued the school
board, claiming that his call to the radio station was protected free
speech such that his First Amendment rights were violated when
he was discharged.
The Supreme Court accepted the lower courts' findings that
the call to the radio station was protected speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Court disagreed that
reinstatement and back pay were appropriate. The Court explained
that a rule requiring reinstatement any time protected conduct
played a "substantial part" in an employment decision would often
result in placing an employee in a better position than he would
have been otherwise. Here, Doyle's call to the radio station oc-
curred after the incidents with his coworkers and students. The
school board very well could have decided not to rehire Doyle re-
gardless of the call, simply based on the prior incidents. That the
call then took place may have simply solidified the decision. In
that case, reinstating Doyle would put him in a better position than
he would have been had the protected call not been considered by
the board at all.4 ° With this in mind, the Court looked to criminal
cases to fashion an appropriate rule where mixed motives were
involved in employment decisions that had constitutional implica-
tions.
41
The Court determined that the proper rule was one that pro-
tected constitutional rights without demanding consequences, such
as reinstatement, that were "not necessary to the assurance of those
rights. 42  The Court then concluded that the lower courts had
properly required Doyle to prove that his conduct was protected.
The lower courts had also properly held that Doyle bore the burden
of proving that the protected conduct was a "substantial factor" in
the adverse employment decision.43 Once Doyle carried that bur-
den, however, the Court held that the lower courts should have
considered whether the school board had proven, by a preponder-
39 Id. at 282-83 & n.1.
411 Id. at 285-86. The Court stated that "[a] borderline or marginal candidate.., ought not
to be able, by engaging in [protected) conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his
performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, simply
because the protected conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its deci-
sion." Id. at 286.
4' Id. at 286-87 (relying on Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); and Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) to fashion a
rule regarding causation).
42 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
43 Id. In explaining that the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that protected
conduct was a "substantial factor," the Court stated that this is the same as the plaintiff demon-
strating that protected conduct was a "motivating factor." Id.
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ance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision
regardless of the protected conduct. If the board carried its bur-
den, reinstatement with back pay would have been an inappropri-
ate remedy."a
This decision by the Supreme Court reiterated the "same deci-
sion" affirmative defense articulated in Arlington Heights.45 Once
the plaintiff in a mixed-motive employment case proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that protected conduct played a sub-
stantial part in an adverse employment decision, the burden of per-
suasion would shift to the employer to prove the affirmative de-
fense. Nowhere in the Court's opinion was there any indication
that the plaintiff in such cases must present direct evidence that
protected conduct played a role in the decision before the burden
would shift to the employer.46 This decision was later relied on by
the plurality in Price Waterhouse.47
C. Mixed Motives in the Labor Context
Six years after deciding Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy,
the Supreme Court considered the issue of mixed motives in yet
another context: labor. NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp.4 involved a bus driver, Santillo, who talked with his fellow
drivers about the possibility of joining the Teamsters' Union. San-
tillo's supervisor, upon hearing of his union activities, told another
driver that Santillo was two-faced and that the supervisor would
get even with him. The supervisor then told a different driver that
he took Santillo's union activity personally and that he would re-
member it the next time Santillo needed a favor. Three days later,
Santillo was terminated. Santillo was told that he was discharged
because he left his keys in his bus and because he took unauthor-
ized breaks.49
Santillo filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Board, claiming his union activities motivated his termination, in
violation of the National Labor Relations Act.50 The administra-
tive law judge held that Santillo's discharge was indeed motivated
by his supervisor's anti-union bias. The ALJ found that the super-
44 id.
4.1 See supra Part I.A.
46 See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
47 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1989) (discussing the holding
of Mt. Healthy and the affect of the affirmative defense on liability).
48 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
49 Id. at 395-96.
.11 Id. The NLRA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge a worker because of un-
ion activity. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000).
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visor did not know about Santillo's practice of leaving his keys in
his bus until after the discharge decision had been made. Further,
drivers frequently left their keys in their buses without penalty
from the supervisor. Thus, the ALJ concluded that this reason was
merely pretext. As for Santillo's taking of unauthorized breaks,
the ALJ found that Santillo had not been warned about the impro-
priety of such behavior, and the supervisor had not followed the
regular practice of issuing three written warnings prior to a dis-
charge. As with leaving keys in buses, the taking of coffee breaks
during working hours was allowed, as long as such breaks did not
interfere with the drivers' routes. In fact, no adverse action had
ever been taken against a driver for taking breaks. Thus, the ALJ
found that Santillo would not have been fired had he not partici-
pated in union activity.5
The NLRB affirmed the ALJ's decision, clarifying that the
employer had failed to carry its burden of proving the same deci-
sion affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, re-
manding the case for determination of whether Santillo had
proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he would not
have been fired had it not been for his union activities. 52 In es-
sence, the First Circuit held that the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff to disprove the affirmative defense.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that the NLRB had
previously decided that an unfair labor practice occurred under the
NLRA when anti-union animus was but one of several reasons
motivating an adverse employment action.53 The Court described
this interpretation of the NLRA as "plainly rational and accept-
able. '54 The Court also noted the NLRB's long-standing recogni-
tion of a same decision affirmative defense that was consistent
with the affirmative defense articulated in both Arlington Heights
and Mt. Healthy.55 Under this framework, the Court concluded
that the NLRB and the lower court had been correct in holding that
the plaintiff, here Santillo, bore the burden of persuasion on the
question of whether an unlawful reason was a motivating factor in
the adverse employment action. However, the court of appeals had
51 462 U.S. at 396-97.
52 Id. at 397.
- Id. at 398.
5 Id. at 399.
55 Id.; see supra Parts L.A and I.B.
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erred when it refused to shift the burden of persuasion to the em-
ployer on the affirmative defense.56
In its discussion of the NLRB's interpretation of the NLRA,
the Court acknowledged that the same decision affirmative defense
to liability was one possible interpretation. A viable alternative
would have been for the affirmative defense not to operate as a bar
to liability, but instead to operate as a limitation on the available
remedies. The Court noted that in this situation, the "burden of
proof could surely have been put on the employer. '57 The NLRB's
interpretation of the affirmative defense as a bar to liability, how-
ever, and the accompanying allocation of the burden of persuasion
to the employer, was reasonable: "It is fair that [the employer] bear
the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be
separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the
risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdo-
ing.' '58 The Court also pointed out that an analogy to its decision
in Mt. Healthy was "a fair one," since the allocations of burdens
there and under the NLRA were the same.59
While both Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy dealt with con-
stitutional issues instead of labor issues, the three opinions all
make it clear that the Supreme Court did not feel it necessary to
impose a higher evidentiary burden on the plaintiff before the bur-
den of persuasion could shift to the employer to prove an affirma-
tive defense. All that was necessary in these cases was that the
plaintiff prove by a preponderance of the evidence, whether direct
or circumstantial, that an unlawful consideration was a motivating
factor in an adverse employment action. Once the plaintiff carried
that burden, the defendant had the opportunity to assert the same
decision affirmative defense. To do so, the defendant had to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same adverse employment decision even in the absence of the
unlawful consideration. The burden of persuasion on the affirma-
tive defense belongs with the defendant as long as the plaintiff has
proven his case, regardless of the type of evidence he used to do
SO.
.56 Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 400-0 1
-57 Id. at 401-02.
-8 Id. at 403.
" Id.
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II. TITLE VII DISPARATE TREATMENT ANALYSES
Before the Supreme Court decided Arlington Heights, Mt.
Healthy, or Transportation Management, it had laid out the basic
framework for analyzing disparate treatment employment dis-
crimination claims under Title VII. This framework was formed
on the assumption that employment decisions involved only one
reason, either legitimate or illegitimate, but not both. It was not
until six years after the Transportation Management decision that
the Court addressed the issue of mixed motives under Title VII.
A. The Initial Framework
The Supreme Court first laid the framework for analyzing
disparate treatment claims under Title VII in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.60  The framework provides a burden-shifting evi-
dentiary scheme to be followed by the plaintiff and defendant in
presenting their cases. Not only does the framework set forth the
allocation of burden in a Title VII case, but it also gives structure
to the presentation of evidence. 6  At the outset, the plaintiff is
62required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To do
so, the plaintiff must prove: (1) she is a member of a protected
class; 63 (2) she is qualified and applied for an available position;
(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; 64 and (4) the cir-
cumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise
to an inference of discrimination.65 The plaintiff bears the burden
of persuasion on these elements, meaning that each must be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence.66 However, establishing a
-) 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
61 See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
62 411 U.S. at 802. While the Court refers consistently throughout the opinion to claims
of racial discrimination, its methodology has been widely recognized as applying to all Title VII
claims. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (applying McDonnell Douglas to alleged gender dis-
crimination).
63 Protected classes under Title VII include gender, race, color, national origin, and relig-
ion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
14 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court phrased the prima facie elements as applying in the
context of a failure-to-hire case. 411 U.S. at 802. However, it is recognized that these elements
may be applied in other situations as well, such as failure to promote and wrongful termination
cases. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (applying the elements of a prima facie case where
the plaintiff alleged failure to promote and wrongful termination based on gender).
0 The McDonnell Douglas decision phrased this last element as "after [the plaintiffs] re-
jection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications." 411 U.S. at 802. However, the Court also recognized that the
prima facie proof specified in McDonnell Douglas might not be applicable "in every respect to
differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n. 13. The language used in this Note is similar to that
used by the Court in Burdine. See 450 U.S. at 253.
6 450 U.S. at 252-53.
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prima facie case is typically not difficult. 67 Additionally, by estab-
lishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff eliminates what would be
the most common reasons for her rejection and creates a presump-
tion that the employer acted for discriminatory reasons.
68
Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the burden
of production shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment action. 69
While the employer is not required to convince the trier of fact that
the reason articulated was the true reason for the decision, it must
present some evidence of its reasoning.7 ° If the employer fails to
satisfy its burden of rebutting the inference of discrimination
raised by the prima facie case, judgment is automatically entered
for the plaintiff.
71
If, however, the employer does satisfy its burden and articu-
lates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's articu-
lated reasons were not the true reasons for the adverse action.72
The plaintiff at this point must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence, not only that the employer's proffered reasons were not
the true reasons for the employment decision, but also that the true
reason was discriminatory.73 Once the employer has produced
evidence sufficient to shift the burden of production to the plain-
tiff, the McDonnell Douglas framework ceases to be relevant.74
The evidence produced by both sides is weighed for its credibility,
67 See id. at 253 (stating that the plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination "is not onerous").
68 Id. at 254 (explaining that by establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the
plaintiff creates a presumption that "the employer unlawfully discriminated against the em-
ployee").
69 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. It is important to note that the burden of persua-
sion, of proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, remains with the plaintiff
throughout the case. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
71 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55 (clarifying that the employer's reasons for the adverse ac-
tion must be set forth clearly, by the use of admissible evidence, in such a way that would jus-
tify a finding for the employer).
7' Id. at 254-55 & n.9 (stating that if an employer remains silent or merely voices its rea-
sons in its answer to the complaint or in an argument during trial, without presenting evidence to
support those reasons, the employer will fail to meet its burden).
72 Id. at 255-56 & n.10 (discussing how this rebuttal by the employer serves to focus the
issues of the case sufficiently to allow the plaintiff a "full and fair opportunity" to prove that the
employer's proffered reasons were pretext).
73 Since the employer merely articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, and
does not bear the burden of persuasion for that reason, there is no credibility assessment of the
employer's evidence until after the burden has shifted back to the plaintiff. The employer
satisfies his burden as long as his evidence, if "taken as true," would allow the trier of fact to
conclude that the adverse action was taken for a nondiscriminatory reason. St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1993).
14 Id. at 510.
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and the trier of fact determines "the ultimate question: whether
[the] plaintiff has proved 'that the [employer] intentionally dis-
criminated against [her]."' 75 Cases analyzed using this framework
are frequently termed "pretext" cases because the issue is whether
the "true" reason for an employment action is an unlawful one.76
B. Dealing with Mixed Motives
In 1989, after sixteen years of applying the McDonnell Doug-
las framework to "Title VII case[s] alleging discriminatory treat-
ment, ' 77 the Supreme Court created a different methodology for
analyzing Title VII cases involving mixed motives. This new
methodology arose from the facts of Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins.78
1. The Facts of Price Waterhouse
Ann Hopkins worked as a senior manager in Price Water-
house's Office of Government Services in Washington, D.C. After
five years in this position, the partners in the office proposed that
Hopkins be considered for partnership. Once a senior manager
was proposed for partnership, partners throughout the firm were
invited to submit evaluations of the candidate, either on a long
form if the partner had quite a bit of contact with the candidate, or
on a short form if the contact had been limited. The evaluations
and any additional comments submitted by the partners were then
evaluated by the firm's Admissions Committee, which would rec-
ommend to the Policy Board that the candidate be accepted for
partnership, put on hold, or rejected for partnership. The Policy
Board would then put the matter to a vote. There was no limit on
the number of candidates who would be accepted or rejected for
partnership in any given year. The year that Hopkins' name was
proposed, a total of 88 people were nominated for partnership,
with Hopkins being the only woman. In fact, of the 662 partners
79in the firm at the time, only seven were women.
75 Id. at 511 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
76 See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983) (stating that Burdine
addressed "the pretext case" because of its either-or categorization of the issue); see also Tyler
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that employment dis-
crimination cases typically are categorized as either "pretext" cases or "mixed-motives" cases).
77 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 (1981) (stating that the Court set forth the framework for the
"basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof' for these types of cases in
McDonnell Douglas).
78 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
79 Id. at 233.
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When the partners submitted Hopkins' name for considera-
tion, they pointed to her diligence in securing a $25 million con-
tract with the Department of State, stating that she carried out the
deal "virtually at the partner level." 80 Additionally, the partners
described Hopkins as "an outstanding professional" who had a
"strong character, independence and integrity., 81 Trial testimony
indicated that clients felt the same way about Hopkins.82 The dis-
trict court found that none of the other candidates for partner at
that time "had a comparable record in terms of successfully secur-
ing major contracts for the partnership. 83  Despite this praise,
Hopkins' partnership bid was put on hold and was ultimately re-
jected the following year. 84
Price Waterhouse claimed that Hopkins was put on hold, and
eventually rejected, because of problems with her interpersonal
skills. Before being nominated for partnership, Hopkins had been
counseled to improve relations with staff members. Most of the
negative remarks on partners' evaluations in Hopkins' bid related
that she could be too aggressive, harsh, and impatient with staff
85
members working on her projects. At the same time, there were
many remarks that appeared critical of Hopkins' personality be-
cause she was female. Evaluations described her as "macho" and
recommended that she go to charm school. Partners who had very
little contact with Hopkins described her as "universally disliked
by staff" and "consistently annoying and irritating., 8 6 In fact,
Hopkins was advised by a member of the Policy Board that she
should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry"
in order to improve her chances of being accepted for partner-
ship.87
Hopkins was not the only woman candidate to have been
evaluated in gender-based terms. The district court concluded that
if partners believed a female candidate could retain her femininity
while also being an effective manager, that candidate would be
viewed favorably. The court also found that one partner consis-
tently voiced his view that women could not function effectively
as senior managers and that he would never seriously consider a
80 Id.
11 Id. at 234.
82 Id.
83 Id.
91 Id. at 231-32.
85 Id. at 234-35.
86 Id. at 235.
87 Id.
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woman's bid for partnership, yet the firm did nothing to discour-
age his remarks and considered them when evaluating candidates.88
2. The Price Waterhouse Plurality
On appeal, a plurality89 of the Supreme Court determined that
the plaintiff in a Title VII mixed-motive case bears the burden of
persuasion on the issue of whether discrimination was a factor in
the adverse employment decision against her. 90 However, once the
plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a dis-
criminatory factor played a "motivating part" in the employment
decision, the employer can avoid all liability by asserting the same
decision affirmative defense formulated in the Court's prior deci-
sions in Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy.91 While the plaintiff
retains the burden of persuasion as to whether a protected charac-
teristic was a motivating factor in the adverse employment deci-
sion, the employer bears the burden of persuasion for the affirma-
tive defense.92
The Court parted from the McDonnell Douglas framework in
this case because that framework was based on the idea that either
a legitimate or an illegitimate factor was the sole reason behind an
adverse employment action.93 The Court recognized that the
words "because of" in Title VII do not indicate that discrimination
must be the sole reason behind an adverse action in order for a
statutory violation to be established. Instead, "Title VII meant to
condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate
and illegitimate considerations. 94 The plurality decided that the
McDonnell Douglas framework was inappropriate where a deci-
sion was based on both factors. 95 However, the plurality did not
reject the possibility that a plaintiff could prove her case under the
88 Id. at 236.
89 The six-member majority was split 4-1 -1. Id. at 231.
9 Id. at 246. The Court relied heavily on the legislative history of Title VII, as well as on
the existence of an exception for "bona fide occupation qualifications," in determining that one
of the statute's important goals was to preserve an employer's freedom of choice in making
employment decisions. Id. at 242-44.
91 Id. at 244-45, 246. See supra Part I for a discussion of the same decision affirmative
defense.
92 490 U.S. at 245-46.
93 Id. at 247.
9 Id. at 241.
95 Id. at 247. The Court clarified that the McDonnell Douglas framework was never in-
tended to be applied in these situations but that it was still useful in cases involving pretext, or
those involving a decision motivated by only one factor. id. at 247 & n.12. The Court also
relied on its previous decisions involving mixed motives in other contexts for support of its
creation of an affirmative defense in this context. Id. at 248-49. The mixed-motive analyses
undertaken in some of these contexts are discussed supra Part I.
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mixed-motive scheme by using circumstantial evidence, as was
allowed within the McDonnell Douglas framework. 96 Thus, under
the plurality opinion, a plaintiff may prevail in a mixed-motive
case by presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence that the
employer's decision was based, in part, on unlawful discrimina-
tion.97
The plurality made the same decision affirmative defense a
complete bar to liability under Title VII in an effort to recognize
and retain the employer's freedom of choice in making employ-
ment decisions. The Court felt that the statutory intent to preserve
this freedom was clear in both the statute's legislative and judicial
history, pointing to the existence of the bona fide occupational
qualification and "business necessity" defenses as evidence of the
"awareness of Title VII's balance between employee rights and
employer prerogatives. 98  Thus, according to the plurality, the
same decision affirmative defense bar to liability was a "balance of
burdens" that directly resulted from "Title VII's balance of
rights." 99 Justice O'Connor, however, had a different view of the
reasoning behind the "balance of burdens."
3. Justice O'Connor's Concurrencel
°°
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor characterized the
Price Waterhouse decision as "a supplement" to the framework set
forth in McDonnell Douglas and clarified in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.10 1 She noted, however, that a major
problem in mixed-motive cases that was not present in pretext
cases was the issue of causation. Relying on basic principles of
tort law, Justice O'Connor pointed out that Title VII makes it clear
that discrimination must be a "but for" cause of the adverse em-
96 To the contrary, the plurality specifically stated that it was not suggesting "a limitation
on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment
decision." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251-52.
97 Id. at 251 ("In making this showing [that discrimination was a motivating factor],
stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part.").
98 Id. at 242-43. The Court noted that while an employer is not allowed to take gender
into account in making a decision, it is still allowed to take adverse action against a woman for
other reasons. Id. at 244.
99 Id. at 244-45.
""Justice White, in his concurring opinion, would have followed Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. ofEduc, v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), and shifted the burden to the employer only
after the plaintiff provided evidence that discrimination was a substantial factor in the adverse
employment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258-59 (White, J., concurring). Since
Justice White's opinion was not the narrowest of the Price Waterhouse opinions, it has not been
considered in much detail by the lower courts and thus is not examined in this Note.
101 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ployment action being contested. 0 2  As such, the plaintiff in a
mixed-motive case must present, according to Justice O'Connor,
"direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial
factor in the decision" of the employer. 0 3  If the plaintiff fails to
provide direct evidence of discrimination, her claim is examined
under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 04 If, however, the
plaintiff does present direct evidence, the burden of persuasion
shifts to the employer to justify its decision.105  Justice O'Connor
did not view this shift to the employer as an affirmative defense,
but as a shift in the burden of persuasion generally, which would
otherwise typically remain with the plaintiff throughout the case.'(*
The mixed-motive plaintiff is entitled to shift the burden of
persuasion to the employer in this situation because she has pre-
sented direct evidence of the employer's wrongdoing but cannot
"pinpoint discrimination as the precise cause of her injury." 0 7 At
this point, it is only fair that the employer should have to prove the
legitimacy of his decision.' 0 8  Thus, when the plaintiff submits
strong evidence that the employer considered discriminatory fac-
tors in its decision-making, a presumption is created that those
factors actually made a difference to the decision.' °9 If the em-
ployer then fails to persuade the factfinder that he was actually
motivated by legitimate factors, the factfinder is allowed to con-
clude that the discriminatory factors were a "but for" cause of the
employment decision and find for the plaintiff." 0
102 Where there is only one factor motivating a decision, causation is clear regardless of
whether the factor was lawful or unlawful. However, when both legitimate and illegitimate
factors motivate an employment decision, the issue of causation becomes blurred. See id. at
263 -66.
103 Id. at 276. Direct evidence of a discriminatory animus is not necessary in pretext cases
under the McDonnell Douglas - Burdine framework because it is assumed that the plaintiffs in
such cases will have difficulty obtaining direct evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. at
271. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor apparently believes that direct evidence of partial dis-
criminatory animus is easier for plaintiffs to come by.
'I' Id. at 278-79.
105 Id. at 276 (explaining that the presentation of direct evidence of discrimination by the
plaintiff will raise a presumption that "discriminatory animus" played a role in the employer's
decision, a presumption which must then be disproved by the employer).
106 See id. at 278-79 (pointing out that under a McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, the
burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff, while under a Price Waterhouse analysis, it
does not).
107 Id. at 273 (stating that it only makes sense to shift the "risk of nonpersuasion" to the
employer where the employer's consideration of an illegitimate criterion created the uncertainty
as to causation in the first place).
108 See id. (stating that making the plaintiff prove that any one factor, out of several, was
the reason for the employer's decision would be akin to voiding Title VII liability in mixed-
motive cases completely).
109 Id. at 276.
"
0 See id. at 277 (stating that "[i]f the employer fails to carry this burden, the factfinder is
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Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that the presentation of
evidence in a Title VII disparate treatment case should follow the
general framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas: the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case. At that time, the plaintiff
should present whatever direct evidence is available that discrimi-
nation was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Once
the prima facie case is established, the defendant presents its case,
including any available evidence that there were legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons motivating the decision. Once the defen-
dant has presented its case, the court must determine whether the
plaintiff has met the Price Waterhouse threshold of presenting
direct evidence that discrimination was a motivating factor in the
employer's decision. If so, the court should proceed with a mixed-
motive analysis. If the plaintiff has not met the direct evidence
threshold, the court should proceed with the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis."' The only distinction between the two analyses
was based on the type of evidence presented.
III. TITLE VII AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment based on race, sex, religion, color, or national
origin. Specifically, Title VII makes it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.11
2
justified in concluding that the decision was made 'because of consideration of the illegitimate
factor").
I ld. at 278-79 (commenting that under the pretext analysis, the burden of persuasion will
remain with the plaintiff, instead of being shifted to the employer).
11242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
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In considering Title VII, the House of Representatives found
that "in the last decade it has become increasingly clear that pro-
gress [towards eliminating discrimination] has been too slow and
that national legislation is required to meet a national need which
becomes ever more obvious."" 3 Furthermore, the purpose of Title
VII was "to eliminate ... discrimination in employment based on
race, color, religion, or national origin."' 1 4 Additionally, both the
House and the Senate refused to pass amendments to Title VII that
would have recognized violations only when discrimination was
the only ground for an adverse action. 15 In fact, Senator Clark
argued that "[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a
difference in treatment . . . and those distinctions or differences in
treatment . . .which are prohibited by section [703] are those
which are based on any five of [sic] the forbidden criteria: race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin."' 16  Thus, Congress
explicitly recognized the potential for mixed-motive cases arising
under Title VII.
In 1973, the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of Ti-
tle VII was "to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate [the] discriminatory practices" that had disadvantaged
minorities for years. 117 The Court further recognized that Title VII
also served a broad, overriding societal and personal interest,
which was shared by employer and employee alike: the "efficient
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially
neutral employment and personnel decisions."" 8 As such, the
Court concluded, Title VII would not tolerate any form of dis-
crimination.1 9 It was with this understanding that the Court first
formed the framework for analyzing discrimination claims brought
under Title VII.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed in response to sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions in the late 1980s, including Price
Waterhouse.120 The Act was motivated by "Congress' findings
that the Supreme Court's recent employment discrimination deci-
13 H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393.
1 41d. at 2401.
15 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13,838 (1964) (voting against the amendment).
116110 CONG. REC. 7,213 (1964) (emphasis added).
117 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
"18 d. at 801.
119 1d.
121 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 2, 4-5 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549;
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) ("Congress acted
to address a series of no fewer than seven decisions by the Supreme Court .... ).
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sions have cut back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of
civil rights protections."' 2' The goal of the Act, therefore, was to
"restor[e] the civil rights protections that were so dramatically
limited [by the Court], and to strengthen existing remedies to pro-
vide more effective deterrence."'' 22 Specifically, Congress sought
to overturn the Court's creation of an affirmative defense to liabil-
ity based solely on evidence that the employer would have taken
an adverse employment action against the plaintiff even without
considering a discriminatory factor. 1
23
Thus, the Act amended Title VII to recognize the establish-
ment of an unlawful employment practice "when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice."'' 24 While Congress did
not clearly address Justice O'Connor's direct evidence require-
ment, 25 the Act does define "demonstrates" to mean "meets the
burdens of production and persuasion."'' 26  So, an unlawful em-
ployment practice is now established under Title VII when the
plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimi-
nation was a motivating factor in an employment decision.
The histories of both the 1964 and the 1991 Acts show that
Congress' goal was to eliminate all forms of discrimination in the
workplace. By passing the 1991 Act, Congress sought to make it
easier for plaintiffs to recover in Title VII cases, thereby increas-
ing the deterrent effect on employers. There is no indication in
either the wording of the 1991 Act or in its legislative history, that
Congress intended plaintiffs to bear a higher evidentiary burden,
such as Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement.1
27
121 H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l), at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549.
22 Id.
1231 Id. at 45 (explaining that the creation of an affirmative defense to liability effectively
permits prohibited employment discrimination to go unpunished under Title VII).
12442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
12 In fact, the House of Representatives relied on the plurality opinion in Price Water-
house, indicating that it did not find Justice O'Connor's opinion definitive. See H.R. REP. No.
102-40(), at 46 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549.
12642 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000). The Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003), was largely based on the clarity of this language.
'
27 To the contrary, the House reported: "The individual Title VII litigant acts as a 'private
attorney general'.... It is in the interest of American society as a whole to assure that equality
of opportunity in the workplace is not polluted by unlawful discrimination. Even the smallest
victory advances that interest." H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 46-47 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549.
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IV. WHAT IS DIRECT EVIDENCE, ANYWAY?
Generally, a plaintiff "may prove his case by direct or circum-
stantial evidence."'' 28 The dictionary definition of direct evidence
is "[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation
and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presump-
tion. "1 29 While Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, does not indicate that plaintiffs are required to present direct
evidence to merit mixed-motive analysis in disparate treatment
cases, the circuit courts have focused on Justice O'Connor's re-
quirement of direct evidence in Price Waterhouse in deciding
mixed-motive cases.1
30
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor did not define what she
meant by direct evidence, saying only that it did not consist of
"stray remarks in the workplace," "statements by nondecisionmak-
ers," or "statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional
process itself."' 3' Thus, the circuit courts have utilized various
definitions, often with different definitions being used even within
circuits. 132 Both the First and the Eleventh Circuits have attempted
to categorize the various definitions of direct evidence used by the
courts. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit has chosen to avoid cate-
gorizing the different definitions and has simply done away with
the requirement altogether. In making that decision, the Ninth
Circuit provided a very brief overview of the categories developed
by the First Circuit. For a better understanding of these categories,
as well as those developed by the Eleventh Circuit, this Note ex-
plores both in greater detail.
A. The First Circuit's Categories
In Fernandes v. Costa Brothers Masonry, Inc.,' 33 a mixed-
motive disparate treatment case, Judge Selya tackled the daunting
129 United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983).
129BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999). Circumstantial evidence, on the other
hand, is "[elvidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation." Id. at
576.
1.3 Justice O'Connor's concurrence is often viewed as the holding of Price Waterhouse be-
cause it was the most narrowly drawn concurrence. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Ma-
sonry, 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999). But see Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players
Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Justice O'Connor's concurrence was one of six
votes supporting the Court's judgment ... so that it is far from clear that [it] ... should be taken
as establishing binding precedent.").
11 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132 See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The resulting
jurisprudence has been a quagmire that defies characterization .... Within circuits, and often
within opinions, different approaches are conflated ... .
133 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999).
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task of categorizing the various approaches to the direct evidence
predicament taken by the circuit courts since Price Waterhouse.
Judge Selya first noted that mixed-motive analysis could "swallow
whole" the McDonnell Douglas framework. 134  Therefore, mixed-
motive analysis was restricted to "those infrequent cases in which
a plaintiff can demonstrate with a high degree of assurance" that
discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse decision.
35
In making the determination that ambiguous statements - those
that could be interpreted as either discriminatory or benign - did
not adequately demonstrate a discriminatory motive, Judge Selya
described the "classic," "animus-plus," and "animus" approaches
to direct evidence taken by the circuits. 136
1. The "Classic" Approach
Judge Selya described the classic approach to the direct evi-
dence requirement as that requiring a traditional form of direct
evidence. 37 He characterized the Fifth and Tenth Circuits as con-
sistently following this approach, with some other circuits adopt-
ing it occasionally. 38  Still other circuits have rebuffed this ap-
proach as being unworkable and not required under Price Water-
house.
For example, the Second Circuit has stated that "[riequiring
'direct evidence', i.e., non-'circumstantial' evidence, as a precon-
dition to shifting into the mixed-motives analysis runs afoul of
more general evidentiary principles."'' 39 In fact, the Second Circuit
has characterized Justice O'Connor's "direct evidence" wording as
"an unfortunate choice of terminology. '"' 40 The court has correctly
pointed out that "the only 'direct evidence' that a decision was
'14 Id. at 580.
135 Id. The court noted that "[b]ecause discrimination tends more and more to operate in
subtle ways, direct evidence is relatively rare." Id. If the plaintiff fails to produce direct evi-
dence, he "must proceed under the conventional McDonnell Douglas framework." Id.
1311d. at 581-82; see also Elissa R. Hoffman, Note, Smoking Guns, Stray Remarks, and
Not Much in Between: A Critical Analysis of the Federal Circuits' Inconsistent Application of
the Direct Evidence Requirement in Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases, 7 SUF-
FOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 181, 190 (2002) ("In order to make sense of the various
approaches applied by the circuits, Judge Selya described three schools of thought that have
emerged in the case law generated since Price Waterhouse .... ").
17 199 F.3d at 582 (stating that the traditional definition is "evidence, which, if believed,
suffices to prove the fact of discriminatory animus without inference, presumption, or resort to
other evidence").
'38 Id.
139 Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1184 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), for the proposition that a
plaintiff may prove her case with direct or circumstantial evidence).
140Id. at 1185.
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made 'because of' an impermissible factor would be an admission
by the decisionmaker such as 'I fired him because he was too
old." 4'4 In 2001, the Second Circuit reinforced this view, stating
"evidence of a forbidden factor may be direct or circumstantial,
although the latter must be 'tied directly to the alleged discrimina-
tory animus.' 
142
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has noted that "it is
far from clear that Justice O'Connor's opinion, in which no other
Justice joined, should be taken as establishing binding prece-
dent."'143 Even if Justice O'Connor's opinion is taken as the hold-
ing of Price Waterhouse, the court explained that "[tihe emphasis
of Justice O'Connor's opinion is on the substantial factor require-
ment, not on the distinction between types of evidence."' 44 The
difference between direct and circumstantial evidence purportedly
required by Justice O'Connor does not make sense because "the
decision to shift the burden of persuasion properly rests upon the
strength of the plaintiff's evidence of discrimination, not the con-
tingent methods by which that evidence is adduced."'' 4' This is
true in many contexts - the quality of the evidence is the focus, not
the type of evidence presented.
2. The "Animus Plus" Approach
Judge Selya explained that circuits that follow this approach
define direct evidence as "evidence, both direct and circumstantial,
of conduct or statements that (1) reflect directly the alleged dis-
criminatory animus and (2) bear squarely on the contested em-
ployment decision."' 146 He placed only the Fourth and D.C. Cir-
cuits as consistently in this group, with the Third, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits occasionally supporting it. Judge Selya noted that
the issue under this approach is not the type of evidence presented,
but rather its connection to the discriminatory animus and the
overall strength of the plaintiff's case. 147 The First Circuit recently
141 Id. (stating that even a statement like "You're fired, old man" requires the factfinder to
draw an inference that age was a causal factor in the decision and thus is not truly direct evi-
dence).
142 Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Os-
trowski v. At. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992), to explain that statistical evi-
dence alone, stray remarks, or remarks by a non-decisionmaker would not suffice).
141 Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
144 Id. Justice White also focused on this aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 259 (1989) (White, J., concurring).
145 131 F.3d at 204.
146 Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 582 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Tay-
lor v. Va. Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1999)).
147 Id. at 582.
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utilized this approach in Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc.,, 48
where the court defined direct evidence as "evidence that unambi-
guously implicates a [discriminatory] motive."'' 49 While this stan-
dard is not as restrictive as the classic approach, it still requires a
higher standard for the plaintiff than the "not onerous" burden of
proving the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.
The D.C. Circuit position, discussed above, also falls under
the animus plus approach. In its opinion in Thomas v. National
Football League Players Association,'50 the court specified that the
emphasis is on the connection between the discriminatory animus
and the adverse employment decision, "not . . . the mere existence
of other, potentially unrelated, forms of discrimination in the
workplace."' 15' Thus, the evidence must relate to the particular
decision at issue, and may include statements by decisionmakers as
long as the plaintiff can establish that such statements were made
in connection with the particular decision being contested.
The Thomas court also correctly pointed out that even Justice
O'Connor did not rely on a strict definition of direct evidence in
finding for Hopkins in Price Waterhouse. The partners responsi-
ble for rejecting Hopkins' bid for partnership never expressly
stated, nor even admitted, that the decision was actually motivated
by consideration of Hopkins' gender. Instead, Justice O'Connor
drew an inference from the fact that gender-related comments were
included on the partnership evaluations and that those evaluations
were then considered in making the decision to conclude that gen-
der bias caused Hopkins' rejection. 152 Justice O'Connor herself
acknowledged that there was a strong showing that Price Water-
house relied on an impermissible criterion in deciding to reject
Hopkins, but "the connection between the employer's illegitimate
motivation and any injury to the ...plaintiff is unclear.' 53  A
causal inference was therefore necessary between the employer's
14 300 F.3d 21 (lst Cir. 2002).
149 Id. at 25 (stating that the court requires "statements that give us a 'high degree of assur-
ance' that a termination was attributable to discrimination"); see Hoffman, supra note 136, at
199-200 (discussing the First Circuit's switch from the classic approach to the animus plus
approach).
1- 131 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
11 Id. at 204.
1
5 2 Id.
153 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 266 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining that the members of a class action disparate treatment case stand in the same posi-
tion as Hopkins and in such a situation, it was appropriate to shift the burden of persuasion to
the employer to show the same decision would have been made even in the absence of the
illegitimate factors).
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motivation and the adverse employment decision. By its very
definition, this type of evidence is circumstantial, not direct.
3. The "Animus" Approach
Judge Selya's animus approach is basically a relaxed version
of the animus plus approach. Courts that follow this approach
generally require only that the evidence presented reflect discrimi-
natory animus by the employer, even if it is not directly related to
the employment decision at issue. Judge Selya, and a review of
recent cases, places the Second Circuit firmly in this category,
with other circuits occasionally advocating its use.
15 4
Under this approach, circuits allow the use of either direct or
circumstantial evidence. The Second Circuit has aptly pointed out
that "[t]he law makes no distinction between the weight to be
given to either direct or circumstantial evidence."' 155  It is widely
recognized that circumstantial evidence may often be more reliable
and more probative than direct evidence.156 This is especially true
in Title VII disparate treatment cases, where employers have be-
come more sophisticated in disguising discriminatory motives un-
der documentation of even the smallest transgressions on the part
of employees. 157 Consequently, to ensure that employees who ex-
perience unlawful discrimination have access to the remedies
available under the law, a strict definition of direct evidence can-
not be used to trigger mixed-motive analysis. Instead, some al-
lowance for circumstantial evidence is necessary. Consequently,
54 See Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating
that circumstantial evidence may be used as long as it is "tied directly to the alleged discrimina-
tory animus"); Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 582 (1st Cir. 1999) (ex-
plaining the animus position). But see Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853 (9th Cir.
2002) (explaining that some courts interpret the Second Circuit's position in Ostrowski v. AtI.
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1992), as advocating a non-circumstantial evidence, or
classic, position).
155Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1184 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting I ED-
WARD J. DEvri" & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 15.02, at 441-42 (3d ed. 1977)).
156 See United States v. Cruz, 536 F.2d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that circumstan-
tial evidence is no less probative than direct evidence); RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE:
TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 148 (3d ed. 2002) (describing that a blood spot or fingerprint
found at the scene of a crime may be more accurate and reliable than much testimony of eyewit-
nesses).
157 See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed Motive
Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029, 1055-56 (discussing
how employers, before making adverse employment decisions, consult with attorneys who often
advise against the decision until "sufficient, convincing evidence has been prepared, document-
ing the employee's unsatisfactory performance"). The Supreme Court also noted the reliability
and equal weight of circumstantial evidence in the Desert Palace decision. 123 S. Ct. 2148,
2154 (2003).
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either the animus plus or the animus approach would be most ap-
propriate.
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Explanation
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a somewhat different approach
to explaining the use of direct evidence. In Wright v. Southland
Corp., 58 the court explained that plaintiffs in employment dis-
crimination suits, unlike breach of contract or tort cases, are put in
the unenviable position of having to prove the employer's state of
mind in making the adverse employment decision. The court fur-
ther pointed out that typically, the employer's state of mind cannot
simply be inferred from an adverse decision about someone in a
protected class. 59 Thus, the plaintiff must present additional evi-
dence of discriminatory intent.
Originally, the inference of discrimination raised by the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case was designed to aid the
plaintiff in this daunting task by forcing the employer to articulate
some reason for the decision, which the plaintiff could then at-
tempt to rebut. The McDonnell Douglas framework, however, was
designed for those instances in which the plaintiff had only cir-
cumstantial evidence of discrimination. If the plaintiff could pre-
sent direct evidence of discrimination, he did not need to resort to
the McDonnell Douglas framework, but instead could present his
case, after which the employer would present his. Since the use of
direct evidence is an alternative to the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that "direct evidence"
would have to be "evidence sufficient to prove . . . that the [em-
ployer's] decision was more probably than not based on illegaldiscrimination." 160
The court noted that this definition of direct evidence, which
the court termed the "preponderance definition,"' 6' conflicts with
the traditional "dictionary definition."'' 62 The court then recog-
nized that the preponderance definition flows logically from em-
ployment discrimination law while the dictionary definition flows
directly from the law of evidence. The Eleventh Circuit itself has
158 187 F.3d 1287 ( 1th Cir. 1999).
'
59 1d at 1289-90 (comparing discrimination actions to an action for battery where the in-
tent to cause harm can be inferred simply from the fact that the defendant swung at the plaintiff
with a baseball bat).
""'Id. at 1293.
"I Id. at 1294.
62 Id. (referring to the definition of direct evidence found in BLACK'S DICTtONARY, supra
note 129).
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been split between the two definitions.' 63 However, after analyz-
ing its decisions, the Eleventh Circuit found that where it had pur-
ported to use the dictionary definition, it had actually used the pre-
ponderance definition. The reason for this was that the only true
direct evidence of the employer's state of mind at the time of the
adverse decision, which is the evidence purportedly required of
plaintiffs in Title VII disparate treatment actions, is testimony by
the employer himself that the decision was based at least in part on
a discriminatory consideration. All other evidence requires at least
one inference to make the causal connection between the evidence
of discriminatory animus and the adverse decision.164 As pointed
out above, Justice O'Connor in Price Waterhouse relied on evi-
dence that did not meet the traditional dictionary definition of di-
rect evidence. 165
C. The Ninth Circuit's Abandonment of the Direct Evidence
Requirement
In August, 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 166 the latest foray by a circuit court
into the proverbial "swamp"' 167 of mixed-motive employment dis-
crimination litigation in the federal circuit courts. Though the
Ninth Circuit acknowledged the turmoil caused by Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, described above, the court determined
that the Justice's opinion had effectively been superseded by the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which made no mention
of a direct evidence requirement. The court pointed out that in
fact, the Act did not impose any heightened evidentiary burden on
plaintiffs. So, the court concluded, "non circumstantial evidence is
not the magical threshold for Title VII liability."1 68  Instead, a
plaintiff may prove her case using either direct or circumstantial
163 Id. The dictionary definition used in some of the Eleventh Circuit's cases appears as:
"[I1f a remark can be interpreted only as an admission of improper discrimination in the relevant
employment decision, then no inference or presumption is required to reach a finding of im-
proper discrimination." Id. (citing Schoenfeld v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11 th Cir.
1999)). Definitions such as "[E]vidence that 'relates to actions or statements of an employer
reflecting a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation
complained of by the employee,"' are equated to the preponderance definition. Id. (quoting
Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635 (11 th Cir. 1998)).
miId.
I65 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
116299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002). The facts are introduced in the Introduction to this Note,
supra.
'
67 See Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited:
A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 651 n. I (2000).
1" 299 F.3d at 853 (rejecting the approach taken by other circuits of "using 'direct evi-
dence' as a veiled excuse to substitute their own judgment for that of the jury").
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evidence, as long as she does so by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 1
69
Not only is direct evidence, according to the Ninth Circuit,
not necessary to warrant mixed-motive analysis, but mixed-motive
cases also are not separate and distinct from pretext cases, contrary
to the approach taken by many circuits. 170 Instead, courts should
determine whether mixed-motive or pretext analysis is appropriate
at the same point in the trial process. In order to survive summary
judgment, the plaintiff must at least present a prima facie case, as
set forth in McDonnell Douglas. The employer must then articu-
late the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his actions. Once
the employer does this, a genuine issue of material fact arises and
the case proceeds to trial. At the trial stage, after all the evidence
has been presented by both sides, the court determines whether the
evidence supports a finding that one, or more than one, factor mo-
tivated the employment decision. If the evidence supports a find-
ing that only one factor motivated the decision, then pretext analy-
sis is warranted. In this type of case, the employer would not be
entitled to take advantage of the same decision affirmative de-
fense. However, if the evidence supports a finding that more than
one factor motivated the decision, mixed-motive analysis is appro-
priate and the employer may use the same decision defense.'
7
'
Having reached this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that
Catharina Costa had presented sufficient evidence that a reason-
able jury could find the decision to terminate her was based in part
on discriminatory animus. The court was careful not to view each
item of evidence in isolation, but instead focused on the weight of
all the evidence combined. 72  Since discriminatory or off-color
comments are probably the easiest evidence for a plaintiff to ob-
'
69 Id. at 853-54. The United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in affirm-
ing the Ninth Circuit's decision. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
'
70 See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Employment
discrimination cases ... are frequently said to fall within one of two categories: 'pretext' cases
and 'mixed-motives' cases.").
17' 299 F.3d at 855-57. This view is supported by the plurality's view in Price Waterhouse
that a plaintiff does not have to classify his case as either pretext or mixed-motive at the outset.
Instead, at some point during the proceedings, the court will determine which analysis is most
appropriate. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n. 12 (1989). Note that Jus-
tice O'Connor also supports this view in her concurrence. She specified that the basic McDon-
nell Douglas framework was to be followed, with both sides presenting all of their evidence, at
which time the court would determine which analysis was appropriate. Except for Justice
O'Connor's imposition of a higher burden, which the Ninth Circuit disposes of, the two ap-
proaches are the same. See id. at 278-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
,72 299 F.3d at 862 (refusing to determine whether gender-based language was determina-
tive of discrimination, instead viewing it as "simply one more factor for the jury to consider in
the face of repeated differential treatment").
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tain and present, much of the discussion about direct evidence cen-
ters around what comments are made, by whom, and in what con-
nection with the adverse decision. It is important to remember,
however, that such comments should not be viewed in isolation,
but must be taken into consideration as part of the entire employ-
ment situation in which the plaintiff was involved, as the Ninth
Circuit made sure to do. 173 Even in the absence of traditional di-
rect evidence, a court may still determine that an employer acted
with mixed motivations by examining the entire situation and its
effect on the individual plaintiff. This view of the evidentiary
standard placed on a plaintiff in mixed-motive cases is more in line
with what Congress intended when it passed the 1991 Act.
V. Is DIRECT EVIDENCE REALLY NECESSARY?
Given that the direct evidence requirement has not been required
in mixed-motives cases outside the Title VII context, is not an in-
tended result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,174 and has created so
much confusion among the lower courts, one must ask whether the
requirement is really necessary. The dissent in Costa felt that Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion was indeed the holding of
Price Waterhouse and should thus be followed.1
7 5
A. Justice O'Connor's Causation Concerns
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that the "question
for decision in [Price Waterhouse] is what allocation of the burden
of persuasion on the issue of causation best conforms with the in-
tent of Congress and the purposes behind Title VII.',176  She
pointed out that it was clear that Congress intended the plaintiff in
mixed-motive cases to carry the burden of persuasion on "the ele-
ments critical to his or her case." 177 Justice O'Connor's concern
was with who should bear the burden of proof as to causation, a
point about which Congress was less than clear.
The Justice determined that the burden of persuasion on cau-
sation could only shift to the employer after the plaintiff had per-
suaded the factfinder that consideration of an unlawful factor was
173 See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 157, at 1048-53 (discussing how courts may miss dis-
criminatory animus by focusing on employer accusations of the employee's poor performance,
when that poor performance may have been caused by the employer's discriminatory animus).
174 As determined by the Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148
(2003).
17- 299 F.3d at 866-67 (Gould, J., dissenting).
176 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 263 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177 Id.
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a substantial motivation behind an adverse employment deci-
sion.178 The plurality, according to Justice O'Connor, had misread
the words "because of' in the statute and would allow a mere taint
of unlawful consideration to constitute a violation of Title VII.
She characterized the plurality's view as "effectively read[ing] the
causation requirement out of the statute, and then replac[ing] it
with an 'affirmative defense." 1
79
Justice O'Connor did not view the shifting of the burden of
persuasion to the employer as an affirmative defense. Instead, she
felt that the shift was only appropriate when the plaintiff had
strong, direct evidence of discriminatory motivation, but was lack-
ing evidence that the motivation actually caused the adverse ac-
tion. The plaintiff's proof would create a presumption of dis-
criminatory animus on the part of the employer that could only be
rebutted if the employer proved that the same decision would have
been made regardless of any discriminatory motive. In a sense,
making such a showing would allow the employer to justify his
decision, the presence of unlawful discrimination notwithstanding,
and avoid liability.1 80
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly overturned Justice
O'Connor's opinion that the employer's burden in mixed-motive
cases was not an affirmative defense. Instead of shifting the bur-
den of persuasion at the liability phase of the trial, the 1991 Act
shifts the burden during the damages phase. Thus, under the Act,
once a plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
discrimination was a motivating factor in an adverse employment
decision, liability automatically attaches to the employer. So, even
if the employer then proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that he would have taken the same action regardless of the dis-
criminatory motive, the plaintiff may still be awarded declaratory
and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees and costs.' 8' The
1991 Act explicitly creates a burden-shifting structure in the form
of an affirmative defense, as the plurality did in Price Waterhouse,
thereby reading the causation requirement out of Title VII.
In addition to the Act itself creating the affirmative defense
that Justice O'Connor declined to recognize, the legislative history
of the Act specifies what types of evidence are sufficient to shift
178 Id. at 269.
179 Id. at 275-76.
1811Id. at 276. The employer could avoid liability even though the plaintiffs proof identi-
fied "those employment situations where the deterrent purpose of Title VII is most clearly
implicated." Id.
I'l See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
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the burden to the employer to prove the affirmative defense. The
House of Representatives stated that "stray remarks" would not be
sufficient evidence on the plaintiff's part to shift the burden to the
employer, seemingly agreeing with Justice O'Connor. 8 2  The
House further specified that the only conduct or remarks that
would be relevant under the Act's test would be those that the
plaintiff could show were connected to the adverse employment
decision.18 3  The House also stated, however, that such evidence
should be examined "under the standards generally applied for
weighing the sufficiency of evidence."'' 4
Additionally, the House acknowledged that the Supreme
Court had given an overly narrow construction to civil rights stat-
utes during the 1980s, despite the general rule of statutory
interpretation that such statutes be broadly construed. 85 The
House further stated that "[d]eparture from the established rules of
statutory construction, such as the rule favoring broad construction
of civil rights laws, interferes with the ability of Congress to
express its will through legislation."' 8 6  Thus, while the House
agreed that stray remarks and discriminatory thoughts would not
be sufficient for the plaintiff to carry his burden, the House also
did not intend for a higher, more restrictive evidentiary standard to
be placed on the plaintiff. In light of this history, it is clear that
the Ninth Circuit majority was correct in Costa when it declared
that "the premise for Justice O'Connor's [direct evidence]
comment is wholly abrogated: ...there is no longer a basis for
any special 'evidentiary scheme' or heightened standard of proof
to determine 'but for' causation."' 8 7  As such, the court correctly
disregarded as unnecessary the Justice's direct evidence re-
quirement. 
88
182 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
183 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 48 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. No-
tice that this comports with the "animus plus" position described supra Part IV.A.2.
'm4H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l), at 48 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549. In civil
cases, the sufficiency of the evidence typically relates to whether the factfinder could find for
the plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. In criminal cases, sufficiency relates to
whether the factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Concrete Pipe & Prods.
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 651 n.* (1993); see also Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (explaining that the burden of persuasion, to
prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, remains at all times with a plaintiff in
a Title VII disparate treatment case).
185 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 87-88 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549.
?MId. at 88.
17 Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 850-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
18 In her concurring opinion in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, Justice O'Connor recognized
that direct evidence is not required in light of the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 123
S. Ct. 2148, 2154 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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B. Overrunning the McDonnell Douglas Framework
Not only did the dissent in Costa view Justice O'Connor's
Price Waterhouse concurrence as decisive, but it was also con-
cerned that mixed-motive analyses would overrun the McDonnell
Douglas framework unless such analyses were "available only in a
special subset of cases."' 189 The dissent concluded that the direct
evidence requirement created just that special subset by requiring
"the plaintiff to produce highly probative, direct evidence, before
she may utilize the more lenient, mixed motives test."' 90 Other-
wise, according to the dissent, "any plaintiff would opt for the
[Price Waterhouse] framework to avoid having to show pretext,"
and the McDonnell Douglas framework would no longer be effec-
tive. 191 In turn, this would create uncertainty that certainly was not
intended by the Price Waterhouse Court.'
92
The Costa majority, on the other hand, correctly concluded
that the basic McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
would apply even in mixed-motive cases. In fact, Justice
O'Connor advanced that view herself in Price Waterhouse.193 She
stated that a plaintiff in any disparate treatment case must first
establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. Then, the de-
fendant would present its case, including any legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. 194 How-
ever, Justice O'Connor did not mention the fact that once the em-
ployer articulates his reason and the burden of production shifts
back to the plaintiff, the McDonnell Douglas framework ceases to
be relevant. 195 Instead, Justice O'Connor stated that the determina-
tion of whether the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting, pretext
framework applies occurs after all the evidence is in, at which
point the plaintiff, if she has not produced direct evidence of dis-
criminatory motivation, is required to prove pretext pursuant to
McDonnell Douglas. 1
96
The Costa majority recognized the flaw in the latter part of
Justice O'Connor's analysis. First, the Ninth Circuit pointed out
that parties in a Title VII disparate treatment case are not required
181 299 F.3d at 867 (Gould, J., dissenting); see also Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, 199
F.3d 572, 580 (Ist Cir. 1999) ("It is readily apparent that this mixed-motive approach, un-
cabined, has the potential to swallow whole the traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis.").
h~l 299 F.3d at 867 (Gould, J., dissenting).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See supra Part H.B.3.
194 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9-5 Id. at 278-79; see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
96490 U.S. at 278-79.
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to use the McDonnell Douglas framework in the first place. 197
Additionally, the majority pointed out that at the evidence evalua-
tion stage, the McDonnell Douglas framework unnecessarily ig-
nores the ultimate issue of "discrimination vel non."' 98 Therefore,
the McDonnell Douglas framework necessarily applies at an ear-
lier stage of the proceedings and mainly serves to direct the pres-
entation of evidence.199 Once at trial and after all the evidence has
been presented, the question is not which framework to apply, as
suggested by Justice O'Connor, but instead "what legal conclu-
sions the evidence could reasonably support.' The decision
about appropriately instructing the jury depends on a determina-
tion of "whether the evidence supports a finding that just one - or
more than one - factor" motivated the adverse employment deci-
201
sion.
If the trial judge finds that the evidence could support a con-
clusion that only an unlawful factor motivated the adverse decision
or was not an issue at all in the decision, then a "pretext" instruc-
tion would be appropriate. In that case, the employer would not be
entitled to the same decision affirmative defense to damages pro-
vided by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. If, on the other hand, the
trial judge finds that the evidence could support a conclusion that
the action was motivated by both a discriminatory factor and a
legitimate factor, then a "mixed-motive" instruction would be ap-
propriate. In that case, the employer could avail himself of the
affirmative defense.2 °2  Since this is all determined after the
McDonnell Douglas framework has been applied, if at all, concern
that the McDonnell Douglas framework will be overrun is mis-
placed.
C. Making It Too Easy for Plaintiffs to Prevail
Whether or not allowing for mixed-motives analysis without
direct evidence makes it easier for a plaintiff to prevail in a dispa-
rate treatment case is also debatable. The plaintiff must still prove
197 Costa, 299 F.3d at 855 ("Evidence can be in the form of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case, or other sufficient evidence - direct or circumstantial - of discriminatory intent.")
(citation omitted).
198 Id. at 855-56 (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S.
711,714 (1983)).
199 See discussion supra Part II.A.
200 299 F.3d at 856.
201 Id. The Supreme Court failed to address this progression in its Desert Palace decision.
As a result, confusion over the application of McDonnell Douglas in mixed-motive cases may
prove to be a continuing source of confusion in the lower courts.
202 Id. at 856-57.
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by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was in-
volved in the adverse employment action. As several courts and
commentators have noted, evidence of discriminatory animus is
not easy to obtain, especially given the savvy nature of today's
employers and the subtle forms that discrimination can take.2 °3
While it may be somewhat easier for a plaintiff to prove that dis-
crimination was a cause, rather than the cause, of an employment
action, mixed-motive analysis has the distinct possibility of afford-
ing the plaintiff with less satisfactory remedies than would pretext
analysis given the availability of the affirmative defense in mixed-
motives cases. Since pursuing a claim is a time-consuming and
costly venture, plaintiffs may actually be less likely to bring claims
of disparate treatment at all, knowing that their efforts will not be
fully compensated should the defendant prove the affirmative de-
fense.
Additionally, under the Price Waterhouse framework, a plain-
tiff who fails to prove mixed motives must still prove pretext.
This creates a problem in a genuine mixed-motive situation: the
plaintiff will not be able to prove pretext because there is not any
pretext to be proven - the employer really did rely on a legitimate
factor. In those situations, the employers would get away with
discrimination because the plaintiff could not obtain the necessary
direct evidence of discrimination, which the Court has recognized
is very difficult to obtain anyway. In such cases, not only are the
goals of Title VII and the 1991 Act not attained, but the McDon-
nell Douglas framework fails as well, since it was designed to af-
ford plaintiffs an avenue for proving discrimination in the absence
of direct evidence.
Finally, as discussed above, the language and legislative his-
tory of both Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 indicate
that Congress intended both to be read broadly so employers
would feel their full deterrent effects. Congress was not intent on
just eradicating the most obvious cases of discrimination, but
eliminating all discrimination in the workplace. There was no
indication that Congress intended for plaintiffs to bear a higher
evidentiary burden in some cases but not in others. Instead, Con-
gress wanted the courts to apply the same preponderance of the
evidence standard as had been applied for years prior to the 1991
Act's passage. Congress was displeased with the Supreme Court's
continued narrowing of remedial statutes generally and civil rights
statutes in particular, and tried to send a distinct message to that
21 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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effect. 2°4 Given the language and history of Title VII and the 1991
Act, the Costa Court's interpretation of mixed-motive analysis is
most in line with what Congress intended.
CONCLUSION
Much has been made of Justice O'Connor's direct evidence
requirement for plaintiffs in mixed-motive Title VII disparate
treatment cases. However, the Supreme Court has finally ad-
dressed, and put to rest, the direct evidence issue. By analyzing
the clear and unambiguous language of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the Court correctly concluded that Congress did not intend
for there to be a heightened standard of proof in mixed-motive
disparate treatment cases under Title VII. While the Court did
briefly discuss the use of circumstantial evidence outside the Title
VII context, its opinion did not address several other factors that
help make it clear that direct evidence should never have been a
requirement in mixed-motive analysis in the first place.
First, the direct evidence requirement conflicted with the
Court's own precedent in mixed-motive cases. The Court's deci-
sions in Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Transportation Man-
agement205 dealt with mixed motives in contexts other than Title
VII. In those cases, the Court required the plaintiffs to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence, either circumstantial or direct, that
discrimination was a motivating factor in the decisions at issue.
The Court seemingly had no problem shifting the burden of per-
suasion to the defendants in those cases after the plaintiffs proved
their cases, even when the plaintiffs did not use direct evidence.
In fact, those cases involved shifting the burden of persuasion to
the defendants on the issue of causation, the issue with which Jus-
tice O'Connor was most concerned in Price Waterhouse. Justice
O'Connor provided no explanation for her deviation from prior
precedent of allowing either direct or circumstantial evidence to
suffice for the burden to shift.
Second, the direct evidence requirement conflicted with the
intent behind (not just the clear language of) both Title VII and the
1991 Act. Congress made clear its intention of eliminating all
forms of discrimination. It also made clear that the statutes are to
be read broadly since "even the smallest victory advances [Title
VII's] interests. ' ' 2°6 The direct evidence requirement would make
2(u See supra Part I1I.
20-1 See supra Part I.
2 See supra note 127.
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many small victories out of potentially large ones. In true mixed-
motive cases, only those plaintiffs with direct evidence would have
the potential for full relief. Even in those situations, full relief
would be rare since employers could present the affirmative de-
fense to limit damages.
In situations where a plaintiff does not have direct evidence,
she would be forced to try to prove pretext, a proposition that
would be next to impossible since the employer would have le-
gitimately relied on a lawful motive in addition to the unlawful
motive. Since direct evidence is difficult to obtain, most plaintiffs
would fall into this latter situation and, not being able to prove
pretext, would not be awarded any relief. The employers would be
able to continue discriminating, as long as they did so rather subtly
and as long as they could offer legitimate reasons for decisions.
Such a result is clearly contrary to congressional intent and the
goals of Title VII and the 1991 Act.
In addition to not addressing these other factors, the Supreme
Court did not address how lower courts should analyze mixed-
motive cases. The Court should have expressly adopted the
framework formulated by the Ninth Circuit in Costa v. Desert
Place in order to avoid confusion between the mixed-motive and
pretext frameworks. In Title VII disparate treatment cases involv-
ing multiple motives, at least one discriminatory and one legiti-
mate, the plaintiff would first present her prima facie case as out-
lined in McDonnell Douglas. As is usual in disparate treatment
cases, this burden should not be onerous. However, the plaintiff
should present all evidence of discrimination, both circumstantial
and direct, at this stage. Once the plaintiff has presented her evi-
dence, the employer should present all evidence of legitimate rea-
sons behind the adverse employment action. Once all the evidence
is presented, the trial court would determine whether the evidence
could support a finding that either the employer discriminated and
that his proffered reason was pretextual or that the employer did
not discriminate at all. The trial court would either make a final
judgment accordingly 20 7 or would instruct a jury in accordance
with traditional pretext cases.
The trial court could, on the other hand, determine that the
evidence does not support a finding of pretext, but instead could
support a finding that either a legitimate and an illegitimate factor
2117 If the judge, as trier of fact, found the employer's explanation was pretextual and that
discrimination was the real reason for the adverse employment decision, he would enter judg-
ment against the employer.
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motivated the adverse decision or that the employer did not dis-
criminate. In that situation, the trial court would again either enter
judgment accordingly 2°8 or would give the jury a mixed-motive
instruction. If a judgment is made against the employer, he should
then be given the opportunity to present the same decision affirma-
tive defense at the damages stage of the trial. If he succeeds in
proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the dam-
ages assessed against him would be limited. Otherwise, he would
be liable for the entire range of damages available under the stat-
ute.
The Costa format for deciding mixed-motive disparate treat-
ment claims should prove to be relatively easy to understand and
easy to implement in practice. It would eliminate any confusion
created by the McDonnell Douglas framework and would serve the
goals of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. By making it
possible for plaintiffs to hold employers accountable in true
mixed-motive cases, the desired deterrent effects of the statutes
would be more fully realized. At the same time, many plaintiffs
will still refrain from filing frivolous claims of discrimination be-
cause of the high cost, both monetarily and time-wise, of litigation
and the real possibility of a successful affirmative defense by em-
ployers. JENNIFER R. GOWENSf
-11 If the judge, as trier of fact, found that the employer was motivated by both unlawful
and lawful factors, then the employer would be automatically liable for a Title VII violation.
t J.D. Candidate, 2004, Case Western Reserve School of Law. I would like to thank my
husband, Greg, for his never-ending patience and support and Professor Entin for his guidance
while I was writing this Note.
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